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Seminar fur Philosophie, Logik und Wissenschafts- 
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LudwigstraBe 3 1 /I 
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INTRODUCTION 
The discussion of vagueness and approximation in empirical 
and especially physical theories - as far as it is intended as a 
part of meta-science - faces the following problem. There are 
practically no utterances of practising scientists about the re- 
lation of theory and approximation which could serve as 'data' 
against which the meta-discussion might be 'tested'. This is not 
to say that approximation is not relevant for physics: the very 
first laboratory courses in physics prove the contrary. The cal- 
culation of errors in measurement and the 'theory of disturbances' 
are essential for physical methodology. But these achievements are 
not suited to clarify the relation between theories and reality. 
Consequently the meta-discussion cannot proceed 'empirically', 
i.e. by formulating hypotheses for which 'real life' examples are 
presented. Rather the discussion is 'analytic' in the sense that 
it analyses the connection between theory and reality and the role 
of approximation on the basis of some general background. As long 
as we have no case studies of concrete examples of approximation 
the discussion will remain analytic, and what I shall have to say 
in the following will be analytic to a large extent, also. 
There are at least three proposals for treating vagueness or 
approximation technically. A first, 'classical' text here is 
Przelecki's [9]. He offers an apparatus in terms of the semantics 
of first-or higher-order theories. A second proposal is due to 
Ludwig who introduces topological uniformities to 'smear over' the 
sharp theoretical images of the theory (see hin contribution in 
this volume, or his [7]). Thirdly, Moulines in [8] has applied 
Ludwig's ideas to Sneed's theory concept. 
















